The Idle Margin: Why Everyday Conservation Goes Undone

Vehicle idling—leaving the engine running while stopped—poses a conservation puzzle: for sufficiently long stops, switching off saves drivers money while reducing emissions, yet drivers persist. In partnership with a leading telematics firm in Pakistan, I collect 10-second GPS data from 6,621 private vehicles and document widespread misperceptions about idling. I then run a randomised field experiment varying private information, social information, payments, and an in-car reminder. Private information reduces daily idling by 1.8 minutes, or 9% of the control mean, with effects persisting after treatment; estimated benefits are 3.7 times programme costs, about half through drivers’ fuel savings. Social information and payments add no detectable reduction. By contrast, the reminder increases idling by 1.0 minute, concentrated in long spells—a pattern consistent with procrastination. Everyday conservation failures can persist even when private and social incentives align—and interventions can backfire.

Subsidies and Debt under Nonlinear Electricity Pricing

With Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, Faraz Hayat

Do electricity subsidies increase energy use, or help households pay for electricity they have already consumed? In a randomised experiment with 1,731 households in Pakistan, we vary the subsidised blocks and rebate rates under a nonlinear tariff, generating reductions in average and marginal effective prices. Even where the marginal price falls, electricity consumption does not increase detectably. Instead, several subsidy arms increase the likelihood of reducing or clearing outstanding utility debt, with stronger patterns among households facing payment stress or existing arrears. The findings show that electricity subsidies can improve affordability through debt repayment rather than higher energy demand.

Hardening the Grid: Technology versus Enforcement

With Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, Faraz Hayat

Can infrastructure succeed where enforcement struggles to curb electricity theft? In a randomised experiment with 120 distribution transformers in high-theft neighbourhoods of Lahore, Pakistan, we compare theft-resistant aerial bundled cables with intensified monthly inspections. Assignment to cables reduces recorded electricity losses by 10 percentage points (SE 3.2), nearly one-quarter of the pre-treatment mean, with similar results across alternative estimators and measurement specifications. Intensified inspections produce no detectable reduction over their first three months. The findings highlight the potential of changing the physical opportunity to steal, while imperfect administrative measurement prevents equating lower recorded losses with theft prevented or revenue recovered.

Preaching Against Power Theft

With Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, Faraz Hayat

We study whether moral and financial incentives can reduce electricity theft and non-payment in rural Pakistan. We randomise anti-theft messages delivered through Friday sermons across 42 high-loss electricity feeders and embed an electricity-bill subsidy experiment with 1,219 households. Sermons produce little detectable improvement in feeder-level losses or collections. Household subsidies reduce amounts payable and arrears, but do not meaningfully increase electricity consumption or improve collection rates. The results suggest that moral appeals alone may be insufficient where formal enforcement is weak, while financial relief primarily improves household balance sheets.

Technology Subsidies and Crop Residue Burning

With B. Kelsey Jack, Ben Moscona, Michael Greenstone

We study whether subsidies for cleaner agricultural machinery reduce crop residue burning in Pakistan. Using government subsidy lotteries, we combine administrative records with field observations and satellite data to measure burning. We document substantial challenges in detecting short-lived agricultural fires and find little evidence that machinery subsidies reduce burning. The findings highlight the importance of reliable environmental measurement and potential constraints beyond equipment affordability.

Small Farms, Coordination, and Air Pollution

With Steve Cicala, Kyle Emerick

This project studies whether the environmental costs of small-scale farming arise partly from coordination failures. Using a diagnostic survey of rice farmers in Punjab, Pakistan, we study timing pressure, machinery access, residue value, and demand for coordinated baling services. We use this evidence to design a field pilot testing whether coordinating neighbouring smallholders can spread the fixed costs of residue collection and make cleaner residue management economically viable.

Industrial Pollution and Emissions Disclosure

With Michael Greenstone

This project studies whether making industrial pollution visible can improve environmental compliance. In collaboration with the Punjab Environment Protection Department, we use third-party emissions monitoring to generate plant-level ratings for industrial firms in Lahore. We test whether disclosing these ratings to regulators and civil society increases enforcement, induces firms to reduce emissions, and encourages investment in pollution-control technology.