The Behavioural Economics of Vehicular Idling

This paper studies a simple but overlooked margin of urban pollution: vehicle idling. In a field experiment with 6,621 private car drivers in urban Pakistan, I combine high-frequency GPS data with randomised information, social-cost messages, financial incentives, and real-time in-car reminders to test whether excessive idling reflects missing information, comfort and convenience, or inattention in the moment.

Status: Fieldwork | AEA Registry

Price Incentives and Bill Relief under Nonlinear Electricity Tariffs

(with Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, and Faraz Hayat)

This paper studies how households respond when electricity prices change at some margins but not others. In a field experiment with 1,731 households in rural Pakistan, we randomise 30% subsidies across different blocks of an increasing-block tariff, using nonlinear pricing to separate marginal-price incentives from average-price bill relief and examine effects on electricity use, bills, payments, and arrears.

Status: Writing | AEA Registry

Preaching Against Power Theft: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

(with Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, and Faraz Hayat)

This paper studies whether religious authority can strengthen state capacity where formal enforcement is weak. In a field experiment in Pakistan, we randomise anti-theft messages delivered through Friday sermons across electricity feeders and combine this with a nested household subsidy experiment to study effects on power theft, bill payment, collection losses, and the interaction between moral and financial incentives.

Status: Writing | AEA Registry

Hardening the Grid: Technology and Enforcement against Power Theft

(with Robin Burgess, Tim Dobermann, Michael Greenstone, and Faraz Hayat)

This paper studies whether hardening the grid or increasing enforcement is more effective at reducing electricity theft. In a field experiment with LESCO and the Ministry of Energy in Pakistan, we randomise 120 high-loss transformers to theft-resistant infrastructure, enhanced audit-based enforcement, or status-quo operations, and study effects on power losses, bill payment, consumer regularisation, arrears, and legal electricity use.

Status: Fieldwork | AEA Registry

Coordination Failures and Pollution in Small-Scale Farming

(with Steve Cicala and Kyle Emerick)

This project studies whether the environmental costs of small-scale farming arise partly from coordination failures. Using a diagnostic survey of rice farmers in Punjab, Pakistan, we study timing pressure, machinery access, residue value, and demand for coordinated baling services, and use the evidence to design a field pilot testing whether neighbouring smallholders can make cleaner residue management viable.

Status: Design

Making Pollution Visible: Emissions Ratings and Disclosure in Lahore

(with Michael Greenstone)

This project studies whether making industrial pollution visible can improve environmental accountability. In collaboration with the Punjab Industries Department and Punjab Urban Unit, we use third-party emissions monitoring to generate plant-level ratings for industrial units in Lahore, and test whether public disclosure of these ratings induces cleaner practices and pollution-control investment.

Status: Design